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Abstract
The paper discusses the political and economic background of the Hungarian economic policy in
the age of globalization. The author calls the attention to the minimum conditions of the sovereign
national economic policy. In his opinion, since the second half of 2001 the Hungarian economic
policy has been unable to meet the enlisted minimum conditions.
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1. Introductory Thoughts
Since the political turn at the beginning of the 90’s the economist-researcher – who
spent the majority of his life in the period of theMarxist anti-capitalism1 (socialism)
while fighting windmills – has experienced three shocking factors afflicting the
grounds of economic policy.
The first one is that globalization’s becoming a totality. As the institutions
of the market economy were forming in the mid-90’s it became fairly obvious that
globalization and the totality represented by it, could not be neglected in terms
of the presumptions of economic policy.2 There is no doubt that globalization
exerts a reducing influence on the interpretation opportunities and assets of business
policies, but increases the responsibilities of business administrations. In any case
the business operators of the transformation countries in East-Central-Europe were
compelled to face the challenge that the ‘international’ contents of market and
competition categories significantly differed from the practice of even the 70’s and
80’s. To put it - perhaps roughly - short: the countries under transformation had
started to establish an institution system, which proved to be obsolete or at least
ineffective upon its completion.
The second factor and the third one, both of them I found shocking, were man-
ifesting at the same time, but they significantly differed from each other. One of
1As far as I remember the ‘Marxist anti-capitalism’ term was first used by Károly Szalai, writer,
in his novel titled ‘Párhuzamos viszonyok’ (‘Simultaneous Love Affairs’).
2Among the studies of the author see for example: ‘Globalizáció pro és kontra’ (‘Globalization:
for and against’), Külgazdaság 2001/1, Externalities of Globalization, Periodica Politechnica, 2002/2
126 J. VERESS
themwas related to the European Union. As early as in the first years of the transfor-
mation each post-socialist country was seriously considering the EU-membership.
Among the by-products and wastes of the accession process dragging for a long
time, an economic policy-adjusting to the European Union or more precisely to its
rules, built on the opening of the economy, was the most well-marked. During the
decade-long preparation for the accession, the candidates – among them Hungary
as well – got acquainted with the most important rules and the operation mecha-
nisms of the Union as well as the redistribution process in the member states and
regions. Though the time of the accession was not cleared - the EU had not made
any declaration of intent (contrary to its practice in the past) - the conditions were
presumable with the knowledge of the rules of the Union. Confronting with the
actual conditions for the accession was the shock itself.
The new members could only count on one-fifth – one sixth of the normative
subsidies as compared to the expected or expectable ones. It is unambiguous that the
arsenal of the economic policy – that is understandably reducing in any way – may
become ineffective or slightly effective even if governmental forces are committed
and able to enforce their will.3
The third group of the phenomena is of political character. The terrorist attack
in the United States in 2001 opened a new phase in the history of mankind. It can be
forecasted without any ability to foresee the future that the fight against terrorism
(too) in Afghanistan and Iraq has not come to its end yet. It is clear as early as today
that for the time theUnited States, that has successfully aspired forworld-hegemony,
does not consider the possibility of dividing theworld into interest regions, assigning
to each region different leading countries having real powers (offshore balancing).
It is not by chance that globalization has been able to get the upper hand of the
United States the least, therefore the USA, with the capacity of a world hegemonic
agent, explicitly pursues a policy in which it groups and categorizes the countries
on the basis of their methods of fighting against terrorism, the business implications
of which are obvious and significant.
We wish to point out that the former two factors are not independent from
each other. The time of the accession and the ‘persons’ of possible candidates must
have been influenced by, among others, the situation after the terrorist attack in
2001.
In addition to the three factors outlined above there is also a fourth one, which
has to be discussed separately. Though the three factors mentioned above may
generate different opinions implying emotions as well, their existence as factors is
unambiguous. However, the examination of the effects of the fourth factor is almost
entirely subject to assets.
In terms of making and implementing their economic policies, the majority of
the countries under transformation – among them Hungary – has been maintaining
close relations with the prominent international financial institutions, mainly the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Without aiming at completeness
it is enough to refer to – among others – the negotiations, events related to debt-
3However, in our case, this is out of the question, as outlined below.
END OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY 127
management, the consultations carried on at the time of the stabilization economic
policy, the stand-by credits and the period of the introduction of the pension scheme
reform.
It was in the first years of this century that the rightfulness of the philoso-
phy of the business policy recommended from time to time to the developing and
transforming countries needing help of the above two institutions in a form consid-
ered by the critics4 a stereotype, offering the blocks of mainstream economics, was
increasingly questioned.
From the time being it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the problem
outlined, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the fourth factor also considerably
reduces the scope for action in terms of the economic policy of a country. However,
it has to be pointed out that none of the countries is obliged to establish connections
with IMF or even with the World Bank.
When this study is made, there is no boom in any of the leading countries
of the ‘Triad’. The miracle period of the United States from the second half of
the 90’s until the beginning of 2001 characterized by high-growth rate, very low
inflation and reducing unemployment – called the New Economy for a short time –
came to its end, and the forecasts promising an upward trend put the beginning of
such an era at a later and later date. The Japanese economy has been stagnating for
more than a decade and has been suffering from a permanent deflation process that
can be managed with difficulties even in terms of its consequences. The German
economy also carries robust loads. The growth rate is low, taxes are high and
important company groups are increasingly willing to move – partly or entirely –
to other places, what leads to significant tax losses and considerably restricts the
opportunities of tax reductions.5 Germany, one of the main supporters of the EU
Stability and Growth Pact, was unable to meet one of the most important criteria
in two consecutive years, since the budget deficit had exceeded three percent of the
GDP.
The business life of today clearly shows that the biggest multi- or transna-
tional companies, trading chains as well as investment funds having capital powers
exceeding – in several cases many times – the powers of the former entities, con-
tribute inputs representing a determining factor to the economic policies of their
countries. These business and power formations represent an unimaginable lob-
bying force even in the non-business spheres. In business life they exert the most
apparent influence on competition by destroying its classic (traditional) forms and
establishing its new ‘forms’. Based on the example of the USA, M. Friedman in-
terpreted the liberty of competition in the following way: the agent who offers the
same quality at a lower price or a better quality at the same price cannot be ousted
from the market or his entering cannot be avoided. L. Erhard, one of the key figures
in establishing the German social market economy, takes a similar stand. He thinks
that the main locomotive of the economic progress is competition. Competition is
enriched by new agents on the market, since they create a sound rivalry, therefore
4see for example: Stiglitz J.E.: ‘Globalization and Its Discontents’.
5See details in [18].
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economic policy should give preference to the liberty of competition.
The spreading of trading chains represents apparently how these principles
are altering while everything seems to be formally all right. These agents with
huge capital powers can easily meet the Friedman and Erhard criteria; are able to
oust the market agents below them in the capital hierarchy as, among others, they
have a strong financing background and are capable of maintaining their quotations
even for years. Price adjustment may be commenced when the rivals with less
capital powers go to bankrupt. Of course, there is a fierce competition among the
powerful rivalswho survived. Following the negotiations by the lobby networks, the
governments, regions and municipalities committed to economic policy are ‘eager’
to assist these agents through advantages, subsidies and tax abatements considered
by them as competition conform. Furthermore, over the time the governments and
authorities can give assistance to these determining business and power factors by
stipulating binding conditions for the market introduction of products and services
(ones related to health care, hygiene, packaging, consumer protection, auditing, IT,
etc.) which cannot be met by the market agents having no considerable reserves. It
is not by chance that more and more experts say and put it in writing that the subsidy
competition and tax competition are becoming a determining factor on international
markets.
However, the responsibilities of national economic policy are undiminished
and unambiguous. It is the duty, what is more, the obligation of the government
legitimized by elections and operating the administration organization to define the
rules of the game of the economy within the given state borders – taking crystal-
lized determinations also into account – and to compose the strategic and operative
elements of the economic policy.
In the era of globalization the threemost important duties of national economic
policies6 are as follows:
• Making and implementing a ‘healthy’ economic policy, minimizing weak
points.
• Optimal placing of the economy of the country concerned in the radically
changing production and service fields, technology and innovation field,
within the frameworks of the global markets.
• Managing, supporting and (in certain respects) establishing sectors, profiles
and researches which mean or may mean a forefront in the world, and as a
result may represent the outstanding and differentiating (in the good sense)
features of the country concerned.
In this study I consider ‘healthy’ economic policy as a synonym in terms
of the mainstream interpretation of ‘balance keeping’ growth. The conditions for
the so-called ‘balance keeping’ growth were defined during the Hungarian stability
program in 1995. Accordingly, the growth can be considered as keeping the balance
(sound) if mainly exports and investments are its main resources. The increase in
real wages cannot exceed the improvement of productivity, furthermore, the budget
6See details in [14].
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deficit (in proportion to GDP) cannot be higher than the growth rate. Since 1990
the Hungarian economy was able to meet the above criteria only in three years – in
1998, 1999 and 2000 –, i.e. in the last years of the past century.
At the end of this introduction I wish to revert to the ‘persecution mania’ as
well as to the establishment and creation of an ab ovo weak institutional system.
The economic, political and social transformation the countries inEast-Central-
Europehaveundergone is a uniquephenomenon in the history of theworld economy.
The modernization deficit that national states have tried to eliminate with desperate
efforts is a huge challenge. History should have been more gracious – the adjust-
ment to the traditional model of capitalism would have been a grandiose duty in
itself. This has not been the case and there is no place for lamentation. However,
as regards the continuation of the story, clearing the term of ‘institutional system’,
‘constitutionality’ and ‘legal security’ is of utmost importance. According to the
above statement the countries under transformation are not sufficiently prepared for
the effects of the ‘totalitarian’ globalization7 also because the organizational and
institutional transformation that had commenced at the beginning of the 90’s gave
– understandably at that time – preference to the market economy model desired by
many (the political forces in Hungary unanimously considered the German social
market economy as the sample). However, now the question is what characteristics
and abilities of the Hungarian agents gaining a decisive role in transformation can
(were able to) show.
To put it simple once again, I wish to point out that in the era of socialism
behavior orientation was stronger than performance orientation. I know that this is
a summary statement and the said combined feature was manifesting with different
intensities in time. In any case, the conduct of the political and business agents
working in key positions was led by the experience that a great majority of the
problems and duties can actually be managed behind the scenes in the wings, during
background negotiations, and when the curtain rises there remains a low risk, if any.
These types of behavior were and are characterizing the coming generations as well,
a long time would be needed for their overwriting, but time is so short that it may
have already passed.
Following the collapse of the socialist system a decisive part of the political,
business and – as called today – media elite retained or even strengthened their
positions, mainly as a result of the usability of their information assets and the
privilege of being informed. (This is not a unique feature as regards post-socialist
countries.)8 The business and political networks – which nowadays are present
in different spheres of life as market economy agents – were contributing to the
inevitable and, as a result, reasonable inflow of foreign capital from the side of
public administration and that of business in the strictest sense.
7Of course, the beginning of globalization may be traceable even to the terrain of historical ages.
This is the very reason why I consider the defining of total globalization as significant.
8If one reviews the list of the Russians considered as the richest and frequently cited in the
Hungarian press as well, he/she may convince himself/herself of the truth of the statement ‘many
times’.
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Recently it is the most important to state that the leaders and representatives
of the business and power organs outlined above are invulnerable internally (from
domestic side) – only the prevailing cycles of the political rotation economy may
represent a pressure to modify the strategy – but they are very vulnerable externally
(from foreign side). They are vulnerable or, what is more, suitable for forced
change in mind as a result of their readiness to adjust and because the partners,
politicians and mainly their background institutions are well aware of their conduct
and behavior orientation, etc. rather than because of the differences in development.
All this can be traced the best in foreign policy and foreign economy affairs.
During its own legitimization the elite characterized abovehas already reached
the point where it frequently urges the distinction between morale and law when
counter-interested parties question the origin of huge private properties. Even the
participants of the highest governmental forums are eager to express: the 90’s
saw in Hungary the era of private accumulation of capital. However, one should
remember a difference that is not minor at all: In the ‘outside’, western ‘wild’
capitalism goods possessed by ones other than the state or the community of a
country were distributed on the basis of positional resources.
2. The Latest Labyrinths of the Hungarian Economic Policy
The post-socialist history of the Hungarian economy and economic policy may be
summarized relatively briefly.9 The first half of the 90’s was characterized by the
survival of the stop-go cycles ‘inherited’ from the 80’s and the establishment of
the institutional system of the market economy while the winners and losers of the
transitory period were gradually showing up. The expansion of the privatization
and foreign direct investments (FDI) is a marked feature of transformation. The
expansion of the latter was considerably facilitated by the relative development of
the Hungarian financial infrastructure (e.g. the existence of the stock exchange).
For a long time most of the foreign capital had been landing in Hungary in absolute
terms as well and later, for years, ‘only’ the per capita capital amount was the
highest in the region. In the first years of this century many countries (primarily
Poland and the Czech Republic) are ahead of us in terms of new capital inflow.
Since the stability economic policy of 1995 Hungarian economic policy mak-
ers have been obviously focusing on the Maastricht (EMU) Convergence Criteria,
which manifests in almost all of the major measures. Of course, all this is related
to the ‘sound’ economic policy but the main locomotive is our forced role resulting
from our openness and indebtedness.
The stability program has two consequences, which are ‘forgotten’ by both
the trade journals and political papers (for different reasons, depending on the
consequence and the press type). The first is that following the program there is
(was) no room any more for the discussion of the growth v. equilibrium dilemma
by the help of the old clichés that had been dominating the disputes for long years.
9In this respect I consider as basic the paper [2].
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The professional criteria, as frameworks, had been declared, which could not be
neglected any more by the parties emphasizing different assets.
The other consequence is actually a virtual one. This consequence is that a
very important momentum is not taken into account as a result of the heat of the
debates over the necessity and/or success of the stability program and the simplifica-
tion of opposite opinions: the original goals of the program included the intention
to invest the financial resources saved in public expenses during the months of
the stability program into the business sphere in a market-conform way, so that
undertakings may be strengthened and expanded. However, in the meantime this
intention had changed, what is more, the amounts saved through cost reductions
were utilized, together with the incomes from a new wave of privatization, for the
decrease of the state debt. The strengthening of the real economy was pushed into
the background or postponed, in the best case.
Statistical figures unambiguously show that export-oriented, multinational
companies active in Hungary have been reaching actual success in the transforming
Hungarian economy, while domestic small andmedium (by international standards)
enterprises have been stagnating since 1995. This issue was first addressed by
the leftists, the liberal government and the economists supporting it only in 2002,
following the elections, mainly because of the closeness of the election results and
in a demonstrative way to a high extent (e.g. Smart Hungary and its outcomes,
Europe Plan, etc.).
Our rightist and conservative governments and the economists supporting
them – who, I think, have never asked during the debates over the stability program,
declining several times even to slanders, why resources originating from the program
were spent on the reduction of the state debt – made actual steps only through the
2002 ‘Széchenyi Plan’. These steps were too far from the implementation of an
economic philosophy which may have met the three criteria of a modern business
policy outlined above. However, as from the second half of 2001, the will to
prove at any price, the nearing elections and the expectations concerning very close
election results paved the way for a reflex well-known in economic policy theories,
according to which with the elections nearing the guards of the state budget are not
reluctant to close one of their eyes or even both of them now and then.
The strict requirements set by mainstream economics concerning balanced
growth are well known. These requirements, which were first enlisted by Lajos
Bokros in Hungary following the first year of the economic policy named by him,
can be summarized as follows:
The main locomotive of growth is export and/or investment, some over-
expenditure in the budget may be viable but the budget deficit/GDP rate shall not
exceed the dynamics of GDP, furthermore, the improvement of productivity shall
not be lower than the dynamics of real wages. (In the case of an equilibrium-
deteriorating growth the main power of growth is import and/or consumption, the
over-expenditure in the budget is considerable, and consumer demand is represented
by a growth in real wages that is not covered by efficiency.) The criteria of a bal-
ance keeping growth correspond to ‘sound’ growth and the economic policy target
mentioned above, too.
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Table 1. Type and ‘mark’ of growth in the years of transformation
1994 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
I E, In E, In E, In E, In c Oe Oe+
c – – – c i, e C C+
oe oe oe – oe oe I, e I, e
2 8 8 9 8 7 6 5
where: I, i: import; E, e: export; Oe, oe: over-expenditure,
C, c: consumption, In: investment.
In the above table we tried to outline and assess the growth processes of
previous years. The obviously subjective evaluation, however, takes into account
the developments in the world economy, too. As to the marks from 1 to 10 the
higher ones reflect better results. The change in the growth type can be traced and
the table shows when investment (In) and export (e) began losing their importance,
and when consumption (c) and over-expenditure (oe) came to the fore.
It has to be pointed out that as far as the strict GDP – budget deficit and the
productivity increase – real wage increase criteria are concerned, only 1998, 1999
and 2000 met the requirement. The deficit of the state budget lagged behind the
GDP dynamics and productivity increased faster than real wages only in these three
years.
As to 2002 it can be stated that it was a complicated year from several respects
and the type of growth was greatly influenced by the Hungarian specialties of
Parliamentary elections.
The role of the circumstances of Parliamentary elections is unambiguous. The
former government – in a grounded way to some extent – thought that it would win
the elections and be able to make corrections later, necessitated by the ‘losing hold’
of macroeconomic parameters in the last 18 months of its governing. Incidentally,
international experience also confirms the advantageous effects exerted by budget
loosening on citizens anywhere in the world, before elections, which do have an
effect for some time.
The professional and political forces behind the present government could
not be sure of victory, therefore they had to take risks. They simply overbade their
rivals. (As early as in the first quarter of 2002 more than one economist backing the
inwardness of the present government put it that it was not possible not to keep the
100-day promises (the first 100-day promises – J.V.) though they were unacceptable
in terms of economic policy.)
The amount of HUF 164 bn of the program of the so-called first 100 days
as well as the further HUF 110 bn allocated to agriculture and health care clearly
showed that the ‘traditional’ tools had to be utilized for the success of the following
municipality elections. Furthermore, it became obvious that for this very reason the
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government started to make the necessary corrections with a delay with an arsenal
that it had definitely refused before the elections.
In 2003 the economic situation became evenmore complicated and dangerous
from many respects. The consolidation of the macroeconomic parameters was out
of question. In the jungle of promising, accounting and accusing each other the
chance formaking an economic policy backedby a strategy reduced to theminimum.
Instead of a real economic policy the ‘economy of politics’ of the governing elite
is implemented.
In my interpretation the ‘economy of politics’ means that the government’s
conduct, actions – in which the signs of a conscious economic policy should show
up – are drained and a permanent campaign policy is implemented as a result of
the intensity of the fight in internal politics. The solution or presumed solution of
certain current or not so current business (economic) problems –which theoretically
belong to the field of economic policy – is led by daily politics, the impressionability
of voters as well as the utilization of the opportunities offered by communication.
2003 saw several examples for this from social policy and housing policy to
energy prices. Their analysis would far exceed the limits of this study, therefore
only the tax debates grounding the 2004 budget are worthmentioning as an example.
The basic problem is more than simple. As a result of the conflict in the in-
ternal politics macroeconomic parameters showed a serious disequilibrium in 2003
(with the exception of inflation, unemployment rate and partly the indebtedness
indicators). The declared will to join the Euro zone in 2008 as well as the efforts to
reach a transparent equilibrium considered as a basic requirement in international
economy, made the significant reduction of the budget deficit indispensable, obvi-
ously hampering any effort to reduce taxes. Of course, there may be a marginal tax
reduction, e.g. in the field of the personal income tax, but the aggregate burdens on
the population have to be amended in this case, presumably to the direction of re-
strictions. This is known by everybody, no matter whether he/she is a conservative
or liberal person. Despite all this the governing coalition was taking part in ‘hot’
debates for weeks before the scenes. The public had to see how the minor, liberal
party insisted on the election promises. To make a subdued remark: the minor gov-
ernmental party has to make every effort for the success of the EU Parliamentary
elections in 2004 as the risk of their failure is quite high.
The problems connected with the management of the EU accession in terms
of economic policy arose again under the above conditions. However, simplified
these issues are, the aggregate costs and benefits of the accession are core issues.
According to estimates in the mid-90’s the gain from the annual net EU subsidy
was assessed to be EUR 2.4 bn (current value) by then government officials and
experts of that time.
Referring to interior information from the European Union the news in the
past months and weeks did not exclude that the net ‘gain’ for Hungary might reduce
to even EUR -0.5 bn without special compensations. It is clear that the effects of
numerous factors are mixed up in the statements. We are all aware of the main
steps of the (accelerated) story of the EU expansion in the period following the
terrorist attack. At the WTO congress the United States made it clear that the
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European Union had to change its agricultural subsidy mechanism. Following this
the EU suddenly decided to expand its membership by ten members but the budget
established in 1999 in connection with the expansion remained unchanged and the
new members could rely on no or very low agricultural subsidies. However, the
rigid decision-making and organization structure of the EU remained unchanged
not only because of inertial forces but also owing to red-tape. The official data of
the 2003 Hungarian Pre-accession Program [9] are unambiguous. In EUR million
the expectable Hungarian net transfer is 320, 180 and 280 for 2004, 2005 and
2006, respectively. In other words: one-seventh, one-thirteenth and one-eighth
of the expected net transfer may be given to Hungary as compared to the former
normative data. (To make it simple, let’s neglect the EU tendering efficiency of
Hungary.)
While the price of the EU accession is becoming clearer and clearer, its
remuneration is less and less clear. Signs ofEUskepticismhadpresented themselves
in the candidate countries much earlier than in Hungary where this fact became
obvious only in the past one-one and a half years. Under these new circumstances
the economic policy has tomake clear to everybody the priorities of the real economy
connected with our unambiguously positive accession. On the day of our accession
each competition limit was lifted – which is a natural implication on the one side
and is not new to anybody on the other. The intensification of the debates connected
with the EU is natural but I have to definitely point out that the dilemmas outlined
above should be solved or eased at the least through foreign policy rather than
interior policy as well as by business diplomacy and mainly by an authenticated
economic strategy.
3. Conclusions
The scope of action and sovereignty of the Hungarian economic policy have been
influenced or rather reduced by the following factors in the past ten years:
• world politics, a factor determined by power, i.e. the effects resulting from a
single-centered world;
• globalization as a totality;
• the economic policy and decision-makingmechanismof the EuropeanUnion;
• the features of the Hungarian transformation;
• the parameters of the Hungarian internal politics on the millenary that have
not changed since then;
• the self-liquidation of the economic policy, the subordination of its own in-
terests to the daily targets of politics;
• the political ‘elite’ which establishes and implements the economy of politics
under the auspices of economic policy.
There is no doubt that the above representations are serious statements but it
is highly regrettable that they are true. However, paradox it is, globalization or the
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aggregate of the powers in the world reduces the interpretation scope of economic
policies to a much greater extent than internal factors, still these latter are the more
dangerous and represent a higher risk.
The explanation can be found in responsibility or more precisely in its inter-
pretation. Though exterior changes objective in terms of some countries – such as
globalization’s becoming a totality – reduces the scope of action, they increase the
responsibility of economic policy. The distorting effects exerted by interior factors
on economic policy and their omission mean the forfeiture or rather the neglect of
the responsibility mentioned above.
Table 2. General efficiency conditions of Hungary = f (A; B; C)
A/A1A2/
A1 Business cycle in Western-Europe, which is influenced by the business cycle
in the USA (as well).
A2 Relocation-allocationpolicy of themultinational companies operating inHun-
gary
B/B1B2/
B1 Efficiency of domestic supply to multinational companies
B2 Competitiveness parameters of the Central-East-European countries
C/C1C2/
C1 Strictness of the fiscal policy
C2 Foreseeable character (transparency) and credibility of the monetary policy on
the basis of the relation between the government and the central bank.
In the first three years of this century the Hungarian economy was compelled
to stand the nearly trendy deterioration of general efficiency conditions since each
of the factors mentioned is characterized by deterioration and weakening rather
than improvement. It is enough to refer to the highly disadvantageous effect the
switch of the forint exchange rate target zone in 2003 and its speculation and central
banking implications exerted on the credibility of the Hungarian economic policy
abroad.
The Hungarian economic policy – if this term can be used for 2002 and 2003
which is doubted by the author – is still not dealing with the issue of what Hungary
– as a new member – should be presented to the European Union. In the case of
Austria, England and Sweden the reply was obvious. As to Portugal, Ireland, Spain
and Greece the Union was gradually given the answer since the marked strategy of
each of the above countries was producing more and more tangible results over the
years.
Therefore the question is what a Hungary should be presented to the European
Union? Should it be a country which, based on a sound strategy, tries to reach a
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higher fixed capital level in the soonest possible time? Or a country which does its
best to catch up organically with the technical-technological level of the developed
world? A country which tries to reduce regional disparities? One that is interested
in lifting the dual economic structure? A country which is able to harmonize
competitiveness and wage increase interests on the basis of efficiency? Or one that
clearly prefers the development of infrastructure?
We know nothing about these questions from the documents presented to the
EU organizations compulsorily, made as homework and approved by the govern-
ment.
Owing to all the above it is worth trying to put it in words: what are the
minimumconditions of national economic policies? Which is the level belowwhich
we cannot speak of an economic policy? When can we tell that the economic policy
is suspended as its steps are continuously overwritten by daily politics and as a result
the developments should rather be called the economy of politics?
I willfully disregard the debates over the background relations between econ-
omy and politics, that were seen even by the socialist era (Marxist anti-capitalism).
Since the basic aim of this study is to restore the reputation of economic policy, to
call people’s attention to this fact and to underline the absence of economic policy
in Hungary, I do not hereby deal with the context that otherwise belongs to this
topic.
First of all the minimum conditions for a sovereign economic policy can be
enlisted as follows:
• having a dynamic vision based on a strategy, at least for the middle run;
• sequential (coming one after the other in time sequence) parameters of busi-
ness regulations should comply with the requirements of the strategy at least
in terms of their trend;
• legal and competition conditions should be stable and transparent that can be
reckoned with by the actors of business life;
• in the government-business relation rent-seeking lobbies should not play a
decisive role in either of the sectors and profiles;
• assuring sovereignty which, with some exceptions, is given preference com-
pared to the generally unclear requirements of daily politics.
Since the second half of 2001 the Hungarian economic policy has been unable
to meet the minimum conditions (to put it short: none of them), this is why one has
to speak of the end of economic policy.
The train of thoughts and analysis included in the present paper demonstrates
that there was not and is not any strategic thinking therefore the regulation system
and its creators can better dance attendance on current politics resulting from the
implications of election cycles. The main pillars of legal frames are undoubtedly
stable but the effective range of direct rules afflicting the business sphere is very
short because of frequent changes. Lobbies are gaining a decisive role in more and
more sectors (planning and building of motorways, water conservancy, etc.), what
is more, in the so-called big distribution systems (pension, healthcare, education,
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etc.) and ‘wangling’ proves to be increased successfully. As mentioned above, in
the period described economic policy is unable to prevail against the events of daily
politics. To be more precise: politics is much stronger than economic policy.
There may be two reasons for this.
The first reason may be that the key actors of politics represent a higher
intellectual level than that of economic policy or the same one, but to manage the
Hungarian interior politics is very difficult, indeed.
The second reasonmaybe that theHungarian determination –not only in terms
of economic policy – is higher than presumed by me, for which a well adjusting
Hungarian political and “economic policy” management is an undoubtedly good
companion.
I do not believe in the first reason.
I dare not believe in the second one.
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